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Trademark Extortion Revisited: A Response to Vogel and Schachter
Abstract

Trademark bullying (a.k.a. trademark extortion) is a very controversial notion in trademark litigation in the
United States. There, for sure, is a lot of illegitimate trademark infringement happening. Anecdotally, we also
know that trademark holders often overstep in the assertion of their otherwise legitimate rights. For the first
time, this article documents how large a problem trademark bullying is and how often it happens. Trademark
bullying occurs when there is evidence that a trademark holder asserts a non-famous mark against a noncompeting entity on or in connection with goods or services into which the plaintiff has no reasonable
expectation of expanding. Trademark bully occurs in at least 5.5% of the reported cases. This is the same rate
that plaintiffs recover any money damages. In the reported cases, trademark bullying is as statistically
significant and relevant as cases where the plaintiff recovers money damages. Also, 5.5% is a floor. Trademark
bullying happens at least 5.5% of the time.
As there is no reporting or recording requirement in the United States, trademark bullying, if it happens at all,
can only be found if we use deductive reasoning. This article is based on the deductive notion that cases where
summary judgment was granted for the defendants are likely to manifest trademark bullying and it is
appropriate to label them as such.
In trademark bullying cases, the quality of the plaintiff ’s claim is declining. This conclusion is supported by
regression analysis that indicates that it is accurate to over 99% certainty. That is, plaintiffs are bringing claims
that are less and less likely to succeed on the merits if tried.
As no data (just suppositions) was provided by Vogel and Schachter, it is difficult to claim they are wrong in
their analysis. Of course, Rule 11 and the other potential sanctions do exist. With this study, we now know
that no Rule 11 sanctions were ever applied to any trademark bullying case. Further, no data is relied on by the
various trade organizations (simply outdated dicta from now ancient cases). The data here is the first attempt
to prove or disproved trademark bullying. It is provided in the spirit of an academic inquiry. To me, the data
here supports the idea that trademark bullying deserves the scrutiny that would be brought to bear if Congress
elected to get involved. Clearly, the existing “safeguards” have been proven here to be anything but safe. If nonpracticing entities is a matter worth the time and energy of States and Congress, then trademark bullying is as
well as both involve entities which upset natural markets for and with intellectual property.
As such, Congress should act. Congress could go a long way in stopping trademark bullying if it amended
Section 1117 of the Lanham to make it explicit that trademark infringement defendants as well as plaintiffs
should be awarded its attorney’s fees when the opposing party acts egregiously. Attorney’s fees should be
liberally awarded in cases where the defendant moves for summary judgment and prevails as these cases are
the clearest manifestation of trademark bullying.
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TRADEMARK EXTORTION REVISITED: A RESPONSE TO
VOGEL AND SCHACHTER
KENNETH L. PORT
INTRODUCTION
In Volume 103 of the Trademark Reporter, Jason Vogel and Jeremy
A. Schachter published an article stating that “concerns regarding trademark bullying do not justify new legislation, and instead there are sufficient
safeguards in the form of sanctions, declaratory judgment actions, reverse
domain name hijacking provisions, self-help, social media, and Internet
publicity to address egregious conduct by trademark counsel.”1 They claim
to agree with the positions of INTA, AIPLA and IPO—that there is nothing
that can be learned or gained through Congressional action. They insist,
rather, that the problem will resolve itself without having to involve legislation. I respectfully dissent from these views. Mr. Vogel and Mr.
Schachter’s position, as well as the INTA, AIPLA and IPO, is purely anecdotal and unsupported by any data. I provide here an analysis of real cases
based on real data that suggests that trademark bullying is a significant
issue. In fact, the pervasiveness of trademark bullying is, statistically, as
prevalent as the instances in which money damages are awarded to plaintiffs.
In 2008, I published an article titled Trademark Extortion: The End of
Trademark Law2 where I discovered and reported alarming trends in
trademark litigation. Specifically, the number of cases reaching a trial on
the merits was falling drastically since the year 2000. The number of cases
where damages were awarded and the amount of damages awarded were
similarly falling—in fact, plaintiffs were awarded money damages only
5.5% of the time.3 Treble damages were claimed more often but awarded
less frequently and attorney’s fees also showed decline. These trends occurred even though the number of cases initially filed continued to increase
over time.4
1. Jason Vogel & Jeremy A. Schachter, How Ethics Rules Can Be Used to Address Trademark
Bullying, 103 TRADEMARK REP. 503, 518 (2013).
2. Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion: The End of Trademark Law, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
585 (2008) [hereinafter Port, Extortion].
3. Id. at 612.
4. See infra Table 1.
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In Trademark Extortion, I argued that this was evidence that trademarks were being used for something other than the assertion of a right.5
Rather than reducing transaction costs by promoting business goodwill,
trademark litigation tactics—extortion, if you will—were effectively increasing the cost of market entry for third parties. Specifically, the evidence suggested that trademarks were increasingly being used as leverage
against non-competing entities in an effort to coerce them into submission
of their mark. This tactic serves to broaden the trademark holder’s rights
and, thereby, increase the likelihood that the mark will become famous.
Once famous, competition is no longer relevant where the trademark holder
asserts a dilution claim6—a claim only available to famous marks. Conversely, where the mark is not famous, the holder must show that it is in
competition with the alleged infringer, has actual plans to be in competition, or that competition is in the zone of natural expansion of the plaintiff’s goods or services as a prerequisite to recovery.7
The point of Trademark Extortion was to show that trademark holders
are using the threat of litigation as an additional vehicle by which they can
broaden the scope of their trademark rights. The Constitution and the Lanham Act both contemplate that this broadening will happen through actual
use of the mark in commerce. Alarmingly, it seemed to me in 2008 that we
were embarking on a new course in trademark law and policy in the United
States where rights were determined by litigation rather than by use.
For those suffering the consequences of this conduct, the trade organizations and the United States federal government have been remarkably
disobliging. Rather, Vogel and Schachter, as well as the INTA, AIPLA,

5. Port, Extortion, supra note 2, at 633.
6. See Lanham Act § 43(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2012) (stating that injunctive relief is
available regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion) (emphasis added).
7. With this statement, I do not intend here to enter the debate as to the degree of competition
that is required (or should be required) for a plaintiff to have standing to file suit or enforce its mark. I
am only intending to show that the traditional understanding of trademark jurisprudence was/is to
require competition or the likelihood of competition before a case or controversy exists. See, e.g., Leah
Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 625, 636–37 (2011). To the extent that
American trademark jurisprudence—mostly in the form of academic commentary—diverges from this
traditional understanding, it renders the dilution rationale even more irrelevant and, interestingly,
further incentivizes trademark holders to engage in bullying conduct because they don’t have to show
that their mark is famous to enjoin a non-competitor, they only have to show that the mark is distinctive
and/or strong. Id. at 638. As I have argued elsewhere, dilution rationale is most easily understood when
the traditional view of trademark jurisprudence is followed. Kenneth L. Port, The Congressional
Expansion of American Trademark Law: A Civil Law System in the Making, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
827, 831 (2000). That is, dilution rationale should be applied when the parties are not and will not be in
competition. Infringement rationale should be applied when the parties are or will be in competition.
Practitioners do not make this distinction easy on judges when they claim both infringement and dilution in the same case. Under traditional trademark jurisprudence, infringement and dilution ought to be
mutually exclusive and not applicable to the same set of operative facts. Judges do not seem to understand this distinction when they find marks infringed and diluted.
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IPO, and PTO, have joined forces in an effort to convince Congress that
nothing should be done. They claim that existing rules, such as Rule 11
and others, are a sufficient response to trademark bullying, if bullying is
happening at all.8
Yet, not only does trademark law permit trademark bullying to exist—
it requires it.9 Trademark holders have a duty to police their marks, as
acquiescence to another’s use of the same or similar mark on the same or
similar goods entitles the junior user to a host of defenses to infringement.10
The AIPLA insists that trademark extortion is essentially the exercise of
that duty. The proposition that a mark holder has an affirmative duty to
police all use of its mark, however, relies on dicta from a case decided over
thirty-years ago in 1979.11 I submit that much, including trademark law,
policy, the economy, the Internet, etc., has changed since 1979 to warrant a
different approach even if this reference was not to gratuitous dicta. I attempt to use data, rather than merely supposition, to support my contention
that trademark bullying is happening, is happening often, and is significant
enough to warrant Congressional action.
Trademark bullying is an actual, measurable harm and it continues to
grow.12 In fact, as the quality of trademark claims continues to decline,
spurious claims increase.13 Trademark bullying itself happens as often as a
trademark holder is awarded money damages14; it is present in at least 5.5%
of all reported trademark cases.15 Therefore, trademark bullying is, statistically, as prevalent as money damages in trademark litigation.

8. Vogel, supra note 1, at 505–06.
9. See Ill. High Sch. Ass’n v. GTE Vantage, Inc., 99 F.3d 244, 246 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, J.)
(“A serious trademark holder is assiduous in endeavoring to convince dictionary editors, magazine and
newspaper editors, journalists and columnists, judges, and other lexicographically influential persons to
avoid using his trademark to denote anything other than the trademarked good or service.”); Cullman
Ventures, Inc. v. Columbian Art Works, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 96, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“A trademark
owner’s efforts at policing its trademarks is further proof of the strength of those marks.”).
10. See Seller Agency Council, Inc. v. Kennedy Ctr. for Real Estate Educ., 621 F.3d 981, 988
(9th Cir. 2010) (stating that the defense of acquiescence “limits a party’s right to bring suit following an
affirmative act by word or deed by the party that conveys implied consent to another”); Roederer v. J.
Garcia Carrion, S.A., 569 F.3d 855, 858–59 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Laches is an equitable defense to an
action to enforce a trademark. Laches applies when a claimant inexcusably delays in asserts its
claim . . .”).
11. Proctor and Gamble Co. v. Johnson and Johnson, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 1185,
1207 (S.D.N.Y 1979).
12. See infra, Part III.
13. See infra, Part III.
14. See infra, Part III.
15. See infra, Part III.
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As such, Congress should get involved to legislate a solution. The
best solution is to amend Section 1117 of the Lanham Act16 to clarify that
defendants can obtain reasonable attorney’s fees in egregious cases (like
bullying) as well as plaintiffs. This would encourage attorneys to take
trademark bullying cases and represent defendants. It would also discourage the prosecution of trademark cases that are only meant to harass or
raise the cost of market access for defendants with little expectation of
success on the merits. Anecdotally, we also know that once represented by
competent trademark counsel, trademark bullying cases tend to evaporate.17
Congress should get involved to create an income stream for trademark
counsel who represent the bullied so that trademark counsel do not have to
do it pro bono, if the bullied entity cannot pay.
II. Definition of Trademark Extortion
Today, most people refer to what I dubbed trademark extortion18 as
“trademark bullying.” Trademark bullying is a less inflammatory term to
describe the same conduct. Trademark extortion, or “bullying,” means the
use of a non-famous trademark to enjoin (or seek or threaten to enjoin) a
non-competing use by a third party.
Some seem to presume that the relative size or capitalization of companies involved in trademark disputes is generally indicative of whether
trademark bullying is present.19 Although the relative size of a company
may make the litigation more or less painful to fund, it does not, by definition, predict bullying. That is, often times, large companies sue small
companies or individuals for trademark infringement. Most of the time,
these cases are legitimate trademark complaints where the defendant knowingly or (most likely) unknowingly used the plaintiff’s mark in commerce
in an infringing manner. If our trademark system is legitimate and to be
relied upon, we should not interfere with legitimate trademark infringement

16.

15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2008).
They evaporate and enter settlement terms that prevents the bullied party
from speaking about the terms and conditions of the settlement. What we do know
indicates that these terms are often quite positive for the bullied entity including
cash payments from the Plaintiffs themselves would brought the claim in the first
place.
18. Port, Extortion, supra note 1, at 585.
19. Mark J. Miller, Trademark Wars Escalate and it’s all the Web’s Fault
(March
5,
2012
10:01AM),
http://www.brandchannel.com/home/post/2012/03/05/Trademark-Wars030512.aspx (quoting noted American trademark law expert Professor Barton
Beebe as saying “The big companies will do this to rough up their competitors.”).
17.
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cases. After all, every trademark defendant believes s/he is being bullied;
most often, s/he is simply an infringer.20
Thus, a more clear and helpful definition of trademark bullying is
needed. After researching trademark extortion for the better part of six
years, as well as coining the term “trademark extortion,” I have come up
with the following definition: Trademark Bullying occurs when there is
evidence that a trademark holder asserts a non-famous mark against a noncompeting entity on or in connection with goods or services into which the
plaintiff has no reasonable expectation of expanding.
A trademark bully is, according to this definition, not the holder of a
famous appellation. The Lanham Act allows for the holders of famous
marks to broadly assert trademark rights in the name of trademark dilution.21 Trademark bullying contemplates a situation where the party asserting the trademark right would likely not prevail if the case were fully
litigated because the parties are not competing (and there is no intention of
competition in the future); however, if a mark is subject to dilution protection (meaning it is famous), competition becomes irrelevant.22 Therefore,
by definition, a famous mark cannot be the subject of trademark bullying
because a famous mark can be legitimately enforced against even noncompeting entities.23
An axiom of American trademark jurisprudence (not dilution justification) has been that one seller of goods should not divert consumers from
another.24 A long time ago, Learned Hand succinctly articulated the following:
20. In response to Trademark Extortion, some criticized me for seeming to be
legitimizing or defending infringing conduct. [Find the Scott Johnston quote]
Quite to the contrary, I believe in the rule of law and the value of a predictable,
legitimate trademark system. Economic investment, growth and wealth all grow
out of meeting economic expectations. To be sure, I am not arguing for something
that does not recognize or respect the legitimate assertion of legitimate trademark
rights.
21. See Port, Extortion, supra note 2 at 590
22. See id. at 590–91.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2012) (“the owner of a famous mark . . . shall be
entitled to an injunction against another person who . . . commences use of a mark
or trade name in commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution
by tarnishment of the famous mark, regardless of the presence or absence . . . of
competition . . .”).
24. See New Kids on the Block v. News America Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 302,
305 (9th. Cir. 1992) (noting that “the wrong protected against” by traditional
trademark law was “[p]reventing products from free-riding on their rivals’
marks”); United States v. Hon, 904 F.2d 803, 806 (2d. Cir. 1990) (stating that one
purpose of trademark law “protecting the trademark owner’s investment in the
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The law of unfair trade comes down very nearly to this – as judges have
repeated again and again – that one merchant shall not divert customers
from another by representing what he sells as emanating from the second. This has been, and perhaps even more now is, the whole Law and
the Prophets on the subject. . .25

Paradoxically, there is also the so-called “unrelated goods doctrine.”26
Some claim that its existence requires an expanded view of trademark infringement and incentivizes trademark bullying.27 This doctrine recognizes
that not all infringing conduct is on or in connection with goods or services
that are immediately and directly competing. If a mark is strong, the relative range of goods and services on which it may be used grows. That is,
the stronger the mark, the larger the range of goods and services for which
the mark will be protected. The stronger the mark the more distinctive the
mark and the more likely that one or more of the multiple factors will
viewed in favor of the plaintiff—namely the likelihood that the plaintiff
will bridge the gap between the non-competing goods or services.28
Each Circuit has adopted its own, distinct test for trademark infringement analysis. Yet, many of the Circuits’ tests are very similar. For instance, five of the eleven Circuit Courts of Appeal tests for trademark ininfringement contain an express element that is, essentially, the likelihood
the plaintiff will bridge the gap. Essentially, bridging the gap is the likelihood that the plaintiff will in the future sell a good or service that would
more directly compete with the defendant’s goods or services.29 Trade-

quality of the mark and his product’s reputation”); Kroger Co. v. Johnson & Johnson, 570 F.Supp 1055, 1060 (S.D. Ohio 1983) ([T]o permit a bystander who has
spent a minimum of time, money, and effort in developing its product to profit by
marketing the identical commodity with a similar name and packaging is contrary
to state Congressional purpose of the Lanham Act.”).
25. Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 973 (2d Cir. 1928).
26. Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 F. 407 (2d Cir. 1917), cert.
denied, 245 U.S. 672 (1918).
27. Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WISC. L. REV.
625, 636–37 (2011) (Although otherwise a substantively accurate piece, the author
does claim that bullying is dependent on the relative size of the two corporations in
a trademark dispute. As demonstrated below, the relative size or capitalization of
the companies may make the case more or less sympathetic but is not, in itself, a
manifestation of bullying conduct).
28. The weakness of relying on the “bridging the gap” element was recent
made plain in Robert G. Bone, Taking the Confusion out of “Likelihood of Confusion”: Toward a More Sensible Approach to Trademark Infringement, 106 NW. U.
L. REV. 1307, 1340–41 (2012).
29. See Lang v. Retirement Living Publ’g Co., 949 F.2d 576, 582 (2d Cir.
1991) (the perception of consumers affects the likelihood of confusion because if
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mark law is meant to be prospective30 and allow the trademark plaintiff’s
rights to expand over time. This expansion through the so-called related
goods doctrine has to be objective and the record has to contain evidence
that indicates the plaintiff actually intends such expansion or that the expansion is “natural.”31
The assertion of a mark in a reasonable (or natural) zone of expansion,
too, is not bullying. Bullying contemplates enforcing trademark rights
beyond the scope of the plaintiff’s trademark rights and beyond a reasonable (or natural) expansion of those rights depending upon the strength of
the plaintiff’s mark. That is, whether or not bullying could or should be
dealt with using existing rules regarding professional responsibility and the
like, it is an extremely nuanced endeavor requiring an extremely nuanced
analysis. We do this serious issue no favor by making bold, across the
spectrum claims based on no data.
America is replete with anecdotal stories of trademark bullying where
the only logical explanation for the conduct of the plaintiff was that it was
engaging in bullying. In addition to the famous examples provided by
Vogel and Schachter, some others include the following:
Rob Linden, a business owner that installs blown-in insulation into
new homes, adopted the trade name (not the trademark) THERMAL WISE
INSULATION as the name of his LLC. Mr. Linden operates solely within
the Minneapolis, Minnesota area. Mr. Linden was sued by Questar, Inc.
(“Questar”) for allegedly infringing their mark THERM-WISE to describe
a rebate program and promotion where, as a regional monopoly in the state
of Utah and immediate environs, it encourages people to wisely use energy.32 Although Mr. Linden and Quester operate different businesses in
different states, Questar is attempting to make Mr. Linden stop using the
name of his LLC.33

consumers perceive bridging the gap as probable, they are more likely to believe
that the junior user’s products emanate from the senior user).
30. See Paco Sport, Ltd. v. Paco Rabanne Parfums, 86 F. Supp. 2d 305, 318
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods, 73 F.3d 497,
504 (2d Cir. 1996)) (the actual probability of bridging the gap is relevant because
the trademark law protects, in part, the senior user’s interest in being able to expand into a related field in the future).
31. GMA Accessories, Inc. v. Croscill, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 6236 GEL, 2007 WL
766294, *6–7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2007).
32. See QUESTAR GAS, http://www.thermwise.com/ (last visted Sept. 28,
2014). (Lists “home energy plan” and the tag line “If you conserve, you save.”)
33. See Questar Gas v. Thermal Wise Insulation, 2:12-cv-00007-DN, (Utah
Jan. 4, 2012) (RFC Express), http://www.rfcexpress.com/lawsuits/trademark-
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Lorenzo Borghese and his family were sued by Borghese, Inc. for use
of the name BORGHESE in connection with the sale of pet care products.
Borghese, Inc. is the assignee of the mark PRINCESS MARCHELLA
BORGHESE for use on, or in connection with, cosmetics.34 Unless pet
care products are a natural extension of cosmetics for women or unless
Borghese, Inc. has specific plans to expand into pet care products, this part
of the law suit is best characterized as trademark bullying.
A college student in Missouri attempted to fund his education by selling outdoor athletic gear under the appellation SOUTH BUTT, upsetting
the manufacturers of North Face.35 Similarly, a man in Vermont attempted
to register EAT MORE KALE, upsetting the Chick-fil-A corporation in
light of its use of the mark EAT MOR CHIKIN (in the form of cows holding up a sign extorting such conduct—an example provided in the Vogel
and Schachter article but they excluded the humorous context).36
The anecdotes abound. We are told, by people like Vogel and
Schachter that these are not important and, ignoring any data that does
exist, we should allow the law as it exists deal with these incidents. With
this article, however, there is now good data that indicates that, more likely
than not, trademark bullying is happening and should be dealt with by
Congressional action.
III. DATA
Trademark bullying cases have been, heretofore, as elusive and anecdotal. Trademark plaintiffs are free to make claims of infringement, for
legitimate or tactical reasons, without having to record or report such
claims. Coupled with the vagaries of the requirement that trademark holders police potential infringing uses of their marks, it becomes exceedingly
difficult to tell when a case amounts to bullying and when it is legitimate.37

lawsuits/utah-district-court/87570/questar-gas-v-thermal-wise-insulation/summary/
(last updated Jan. 4, 2012).
34. Christine Haughney, Borghese v. Borghese: Battle for a Royal Name, NY
Times, June 15, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/16/business/borghese-vborghese-battle-for-a-royal-name.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (last visited on
February 11, 2015).
35. See Jim Salter, North Face settles lawsuit against South Butt, NBC NEWS
(April
11,
2010),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/36334733/ns/businessconsumer_news/t/north-face-settles-lawsuit-against-south-butt/#.UeyH9D5VSnw.
36. Chick-fil-A Fails To Stop ‘Eat More Kale’ Trademark, Forbes Magazine,
Dec. 15, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/christinapark/2014/12/15/chick-fil-afails-to-stop-eat-more-kale-trademark/ (last visited on February 11, 2015).
37. See Vogel, supra note 8 at 1.
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Until now, there have been no statistical attempts to show that bullying is real and/or and how frequently it happens. The data below suggests
that it is very real and happens at same rate that trademark plaintiffs recover money damages.
To test for trademark bullying, I looked at all reported cases since the
inception of the Lanham Act where the defendant moved for summary
judgment. I used the database that I built in my original article Trademark
Extortion.38 That database consists of every reported case that was dispositively terminated in America relying on the Lanham Act. The database
consists of all reported cases from July 1, 1947 through 2011. I harvested
from that database, all cases where the defendant moved for summary
judgment and prevailed.39
General legal literature supports the notion that defendants are very
unlikely to prevail in a motion for summary judgment in general subject
matter jurisdiction.40 In fact, in general, defendants prevail in their motions
for summary judgment only 4% of the time.41 Trademark defendants,
however, in the last decade prevailed at 5.5% of the time or slight more
than general litigation. Further data would have to be collected and analyzed to determine if this difference is due to trademark bullying activity
which may not be present or adequately represented in the general data.
Summary judgments for defendants are a good place to test the prevalence of trademark bullying. Usually, discovery has closed.42 The judge
looks at all of the plaintiff’s evidence and, drawing all reasonable references in favor of the plaintiff, concludes that there are no material facts in
dispute and that the defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.43
This is and should be a rare event. For the judge to grant a motion for
summary judgment brought by the defendant, the judge is interfering with
the plaintiff’s chance to be heard, the chance to get a case before a jury, and
a chance that, though not strong, it still might prevail.44 For the court to
38.
39.

See Port, Extortion, supra note 2 at 611–21
For a more detailed description of the methodology of this study, See infra

Part IV.
40. See Joe Cecil & George Cort, Report on Summ. J. Prac. Across Dists.
with Variations in L. R. at 17, Table 12 (FJC Aug. 13, 2008), (re-analyzing 2006
data showing a summary judgment rate of just over 4%)
41. Id.
42. TBMP § 528.02 (2011).
43. See CMM. Cable Rep., Inc. v. Ocean Coast Props., Inc., 97 F.3d 1504,
1512–13(1st Cir. 1996).
44. Panavision Int’l L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F.Supp. 1296, 1301 (C.D. Cal.
1996) (“summary judgment is disfavored in trademark cases because of the inherently factual nature of most trademark disputes.”).
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grant a summary judgment motion brought by the defendant, the plaintiff’s
case must, by definition, be extremely weak. These are the cases that most
likely encompass instances of trademark bullying.
There are some alarming trends when looking at the number of cases
in the last 60 years broken-down by decade.
Table 1:
DecSumAverPercentTotal
ade
mary Judg- age strength age of all number of
ment Granted of case
reported cases all reported
to Defendant
cases
19504
1.87
1.4%
270
1959
19605
1.92
1.9%
251
1969
197014
1.84
4.5%
309
1979
198016
1.49
2.5%
636
1989
199040
1.41
5.8%
682
1999
200040
1.33
5.5%
731
2009
The first obvious trend is that the raw incidents of cases where the defendant is granted a summary judgment have increased. They have not
only increased in real terms, they have increased in relative terms. In the
decade ending in 1969, there were a total of 251 cases in the database. In
the decade ending in 2009, there were 731 cases. In the decade ending in
1969, this number accounted for 1.9% of the cases; by 2009, this number
accounted for 5.5% of the cases. That is, in relative terms, the number of
cases where summary judgment was granted to the defendant increased 8times in 50 years while the rate of increase of all cases increased only by
2.91-times.45
45. Further data need must be collected and analyzed to determine the significance of the fact that incidents of trademark bullying actually may be ameliorating
slightly over time. In the decade prior to the last decade, bullying claims peaked at
5.8% of reported cases. Although this was the same raw number of cases (40) that
manifest bullying characteristics, the 5.5% figure cited throughout this article is a
slight decrease from the previous peak. That is, this is the only piece of data in my
study that indicates Vogel and Schachter may be correct. If this problem is going
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Second, the average strength of the case dropped significantly during
the same time frame. From a high of 1.9 out of 3 for a quality score in the
decade that ended in 1969, it reached a low of 1.33 by the decade that ended in 2009. That is, in the same 50 years, the quality of the plaintiff’s claim
dropped by more than 71%.
Most significantly, the rate of summary judgment being awarded to
the defendant is now 5.5% of reported cases. For those that feel trademark
bullying is insignificant, marginal, and should not be studied or discussed
further, this is an important finding. Trademark bullying happens at the
same rate that money damages are awarded to the plaintiff. Statistically
speaking, money damages are as relevant as trademark bullying.
More significant still, this data is quite well supported by statistical
analysis.
A. Regression Analysis
1. Strength of Claim

The strength of the claim brought by the plaintiff is declining. Statistically,
this is well supported by regression analysis. In this case, where Y = - 0.0103x +
21.942. That is, there is strong statistical evidence that indicates the strength of the
plaintiffs’ claims is weakening over time. Here, with a p value of 0.001, we can
say with 99% certainty that the relative strength of trademark claims has dimin-

away on its own, I would not support changing the law to be responsive to bullying.
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ished over time. That is, the regression analysis for the strength of trademark produced favorable results for the hypothesis that trademark strength in trademark
bullying cases is declining. We also can predict that, with no additional variables,
the strength of the claim will continue to decrease.
This regression analysis also tells us that the relative strength of a trademark
claim is predicted to decrease in quality of 0.01 each year based on a case rating
scale from 1 – 3. For instance, if in the year 2000 the average strength of a claim
where summary judgment was found in favor of defendant equals 1.342, then in
2001 we can expect that the strength of claim will equal 1.332. In one year, the
strength of a claim is projected to fall ¾ of one percent. That is, the quality of the
plaintiff’s claim will continue to diminish.

2. Degree of Similarity

The degree of similarity between the plaintiff’s mark and the defendant’s mark
has decreased since the inception of the Lanham Act in cases where the defendant
prevailed in a motion for a summary judgment, that is, when trademark bullying
was present. This is statistically portrayed above and this conclusion is also quite
accurate. Y = - 0.0115x + 24.664 [t stat = -1.98 / p value = 0.052]. That is, the
regression analysis for the degree of similarity between marks produced favorable
results. We know with 94.98% certainty that the degree of similarity between a
plaintiff and an allegedly infringing mark has diminished since 1949. The graph
above describes this relationship. Where trademark bullying is likely, plaintiffs’
marks are becoming more and more dissimilar to defendants’ marks and this trend
seems to be continuing.
1.

3. Distinctiveness of Plaintiffs’ Marks
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Here, the regression analysis did not support the contention that plaintiff’s
trademarks, in general, were generally becoming weaker and less distinctive.
Where the p-value is 0.80, no correlation can be said to exist.
The data does show, however, an interesting trend that in fact does support the
contention that plaintiff’s marks are becoming weaker. Specifically, of percentage
of cases where summary judgment was found for defendant, it became increasingly
rare for a plaintiff to assert rights in connection with an inherently distinctive mark.
That is, from 1980 – 1990 there were six (6) inherently distinctive marks (of 16
cases); from 1990 – 2000, there were nine (9) inherently distinctive marks (of 40
cases); and, from 2000 – 2010, there were only four (4) inherently distinctive
marks (of 40 cases).
During the period from 1980 – 1990, 38% of cases where summary judgment
was found for defendant involved inherently distinctive marks; from 1990 – 2000,
23%; and, from 2000 – 2010, only 10%. Although the regression analysis does not
support the contention that distinctiveness is declining over time, a simple consideration of the percentages of cases involved, demonstratively, does support such a
hypothesis.
Therefore, it is safe to say that the distinctiveness of the plaintiff’s marks in
trademark bullying cases is in a declining trend. Fewer marks being used to enforce rights against trademark defendants are distinctive marks.

4. Proximity of Goods or Services

As with the distinctiveness of plaintiffs’ marks, the regression analysis does
not support the hypothesis that the goods or services of the plaintiffs is becoming
more remote from defendants in cases of likely trademark bullying. This is most
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likely because there are excluded and unknown variables such as the expansion of
the economy, diversity of products, etc.46

IV. METHODOLOGY
The methodology for this study was time consuming but quite simple. I relied
on the database I created for the Trademark Extortion article that I still maintain.
This database lists all reported trademark cases in the United States that came to a
dispositive result. It can be found at http://web.wmitchell.edu/intellectualproperty/the-mitchell-study-on-trademark-litigation/. The database currently reports 2,972 trademark cases.
Of the 2,972 cases which had previously been coded for, among other things,
the procedural posture of the case, I merely culled only those that reported the
results of a summary judgment motion. Of course, these could have been complete
summary judgment or partial summary judgment. I did not code for this distinction. I discovered 119 reported cases since the inception date of the Lanham Act,
July 5, 1949, that involved a summary judgment motions.
Even though I did not code for the distinction between partial and complete
summary judgment motions, to be included in the study, all cases had to come to a
dispositive result terminating the case. Therefore, each of the 119 cases came to a
dispositive result terminating the case or that issue in the case, but it is possible
that another trademark-related or other cause of action permitted the case to proceed. In each of the 119 cases, at least one trademark-related cause of action was
met with a summary judgment where the defendant prevailed.
Those 119 cases were then read and coded for the strength of the case. The
strength of the case was determined by applying the Polaroid factors. Each case
was coded 1-3 as to the likelihood that the plaintiff would prevail on the merits.
Each case was read and given a score that reported its likelihood of success, one

46. Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WISC. L. REV.
625, 634 (2011).
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factor at a time. In the end, each case received a score of 1-3 where 1 was extremely unlikely and 3 was extremely likely that the plaintiff would succeed on the
merits.
Obviously, this part of the study was extremely arbitrary and subjective, however, it was consistently arbitrary and/or subjective. Two students read each case
and determined what level of strength the case had; difficult cases were adjudicated by me. Therefore, although subjective, it is consistent in its outcome. Collectively, one set of eyes made every judgment as to how to score the strength of each
case. Therefore, although subjective, the results were consistent.
All cases were then tabulated and presented in the graphs as shown above.

V. SIGNIFICANCE
The significance of this study is hard to overstate. In the battle over whether
trademark bullying happens or not and, if so, how often, this study provides conclusive evidence that it is happening and it is a growing issue. If summary judgments in favor of the defendant are indicative of trademark bullying, trademark
bullying happens in 5.5% of the reported cases in the last decade.
The context for the number 5.5 is also startling. In 5.5% of the reported cases,
money damages are awarded to the plaintiff. Therefore, trademark bullying is as
meaningful to trademark jurisprudence as money damages.
This study is limited by the fact that it relies exclusively on reported cases
where the defendant prevailed in its motion for summary judgment. Anecdotally,
it is not hard to imagine many other cases where the defendant loses its motion for
summary judgment. This could be because the plaintiff’s case was stronger, material facts were unresolved, or the individual judge rarely granted summary judgments to defendants because he/she believed that every plaintiff deserves its day in
court, etc. This study does not address the multiple reasons why a motion for a
summary judgment by defendant might be denied. However, to be sure, many are
denied. At least some of them might reasonably be considered to be part of this
study but, because the judge denied the motion, it is not.
That is, 5.5% is a floor. Trademark bullying happens at least 5.5% of the
time.
Also not considered in this study are all the times a defendant and victim of
bullying simply ceases use of the mark and/or changes to a different mark. All of
those instances are not captured in this study. Therefore, all the unreported cases
where Party X sends Party Y a cease and desist letter and Party Y capitulates and
stops using the mark or changes the mark are not part of this study. It may be that
some or all or some percentage of all the Party Ys in the United States may have
prevailed in a motion for summary judgment; however, because they capitulated,
we will never know.
As there is no reporting requirement or registration system in the United States
to publicize when a party sends or receives a cease and desist letter and the results,
it is impossible to conclude how often this type of scenario happens. However, to
be sure, it is not never. Therefore, 5.5% is a floor. Trademark bullying happens at
least 5.5% of the time.
This is the primary finding of this study. I respectfully disagree with claims
made by such authors as Vogel and Schachter based on no data whatsoever that
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bullying is best dealt with by existing law, that as sanctions such as Rule 11 are
available to defendants, no action is required by Congress to respond to trademark
bullying, even if it does exist. However, in the 119 cases where the defendant
succeeded in its motion for summary judgment, the most egregious case possible
where the court dismissed the plaintiff’s case or cause of action with no regard for
its rights to a day in court, Rule 11 sanctions were awarded in a total of zero cases.
In fact, Rule 11 sanctions are very rarely awarded at all. To posit that because a
theoretical sanction exists, there should be no concern about the actual conduct that
could lead to the sanction is particularly empty when the sanction is never awarded.

VI. CONCLUSION
Trademark bullying (a.k.a. trademark extortion) happens in 5.5% of the reported cases. This is the same rate that plaintiffs recover any money damages. In
the reported cases, trademark bullying is as significant, relevant and worrisome as
cases where the plaintiff recovers money damages. Also, 5.5% is a floor. Trademark bullying happens at least 5.5% of the time. Where the ceiling is cannot be
told because there is no requirement in the United States to report or record the
sending out of cease and desist letters or how many times a trademark holder files
suit to enforce its marks. Microsoft self-reports that they filed 235 law suits from
2001-2005.47 However, nowhere are the results recorded, maintained or analyzed.
The people that are not troubled by trademark bullying do not see evidence of
it and therefore are not concerned. As there is no reporting or recording requirement in the United States, trademark bullying, if it happens at all, can only be
found if we use deductive reasoning. This article is based on the deductive notion
that cases where summary judgment was granted for the defendant are likely to
represent cases of trademark bullying.
In trademark bullying cases, the quality of the plaintiff’s claim is declining.
This conclusion is supported by regression analysis that indicates that it is accurate
to over 99% certainty.
Trademark bullying cases are increasing. Today, 5.5% of the reported cases
are likely bullying cases.
In trademark bullying cases, the degree of similarity between the marks at issue has decreased over time and continues to decrease.
In trademark bullying cases, the pace of growth of all reported trademark cases during the life of the Lanham Act has grown 2.91 times while the pace of
growth whether the defendant prevailed in a summer judgment motion has grown
at 8 times. That is, the growth rate of trademark bullying cases far exceeds the
growth rate of general trademark infringement cases at large.
As no data (just suppositions) was provided by Vogel and Schachter, it is difficult to claim they are wrong in their analysis. Of course, Rule 11 and the other
potential sanctions do exist. Without knowing how often they are used in cases
47. Michael Barbaro & Julie Creswell, Levi’s Turns to Suing Its Rivals, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 29, 2007, at A1 (claiming that Microsoft filed 235 infringement law
suits
from
2001–2006),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/29/business/29jeans.html.
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that manifest trademark bullying, it is impossible to take issue with their nonanalysis. Further, no data is relied on by the various trade organizations (simply
outdated dicta from now ancient cases). The data here is the first attempt to prove
or disproved trademark bullying. It is provided in the spirit of an academic inquiry. To me, the data here supports the idea that trademark bullying deserves the
scrutiny that would be brought to bear if Congress elected to get involved. Clearly,
the existing “safeguards” have been proven here to be anything but safe.
As such, Congress should act. Congress could go a long way in stopping
trademark bullying if it amended Section 1117 of the Lanham to make it explicit
that trademark infringement defendants as well as plaintiffs should be awarded its
attorney’s fees when the opposing party acts egregiously. Attorney’s fees should
be liberally awarded in cases where the defendant moves for summary judgment
and prevails as these cases are the clearest manifestation of trademark bullying.

